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1. 
Consider the case of the Viennese artist, Rudolf 
Schwarzkogler. Sometime during the first years of the 
decade, Schwarzkogler, in an unsettling variation of 
body art, undertook to amputate, inch by inch, his 
penis, while a photographer recorded the successive 
stages of the action. In 1972, the resulting prints 
were displayed in a show, "Documenta 5," at Kassel. 
Schwarzkogler's active influence of other artists (e.g. 
Hermann Nitsch, Chris Burdon), has been written about 
in art books, and so on. Was it therefore art? 
It is not its shock value which makes me wonder—to 
the sensibilities of the seventies, Schwarzkogler's 
action may seem no more outrageous than was, say, "Le 
Dejeuner sur 1*Herbe" to those who first viewed it or 
heard about it-. Nor is it merely the eccentricity of 
the act—even though artistic bohemianism is on the 
wane, artistic eccentricity will (one prays) always 
flourish. My doubts about it are of a different sort. 
Les Levine, among the most radical of the Idea 
Artists, has said of Schwarzkogler, "He called it art, 
but we don't have to call it art." His point is not 
that Schwarzkogler was not an artist, but that he was a 
mad artist, who madly damaged the cause of Idea Art. 
The cause of Idea Art was to expand the possibilities 
of art, not (as is often claimed, both in assault upon 
the defence of the movement) to sever art from its 
history. 
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2. 
Now consider a quotation from Arthur Danto: 
The relationship between reality and 
art has traditionally been the 
province of philosophy, since the 
latter is analytically concerned 
with relations between the world and 
its representations, the space 
between representation and life. By 
bringing within itself what it had 
been traditionally regarded as 
logically apart from, art transforms 
itself into philosophy, in effect. 
The distinction between philosophy 
of art and art itself is no longer 
tenable . . . 
But this would be true only if disciplines (e.g. 
philosophy) were defined solely by their subject 
matter, and they are not. That artists have lately 
become interested in something which previously 
interested, in the main, only philosophers does not 
make them philosophers, any more than philosophers 
become scientists when they begin to speculate upon the 
nature of perception. 
It is one of those "borderline" problems. Poets 
are often wise, and often adept at conveying wisdom; 
but not every means of conveying wisdom is 
philosophical and we know that to be so (or at least 
strongly suspect it) even though we may not yet be able 
to say precisely what poetry or philosophy is. 
Painters may have insightful, profound, or witty things 
to say about a variety of subjects, and they may say 
them in a variety of ways, but that does not 
necessarily make them philosophers, nor the things they 
have to say philosophical. Or again, philosophers may 
have trenchant things to say about art, but that does 
not make even what they say necessarily philosophical, 
for philosophy is not a form of mind control, and even 
philosophers are free to say something non-
phi losophical ly profound. 
By exactly the same reasoning, artists may have a 
great deal to say about art, much of it very acute, but 
that does not guarantee that what they have to say is 
either philosophical or artistic. As a philosopher may 
play golf on the weekend without destroying the 
distinction between golf and philosophy, just so an 
artist may amputate his penis without destroying the 
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3. 
George Dickie has been arguing for some time in 
favor of what he calls "an institutional theory of 
art." Its most recent formulation is: 
[a] work of art in the 
classificatory sense is (1) an 
artifact (2) a set of the aspects of 
which has had conferred upon it the 
status of candidate for appreciation 
by some person or persons acting on 
behalf of a certain^ social 
institution (the artworld). 
The most troubling elements of this theory are, 
first, who it is who counts as a member of "the 
artworld," and second, what it means to confer upon 
something the status of a "candidate for appreciation." 
Both of these questions have been raised by Ted Cohen. 
In wondering if it is as obvious as Dickie claims that 
Duchamp's displayed urinal, "Fountain," is a work of 
art, Cohen asks: ". . . i n what circumstances and by 
whom can this property [of being artl be bestowed, and 
what qualifies a thing to recieve this bestowal?" 
With respect to the first question, Cohen wonders 
whether "Fountain"'s being art, if it is art, might not 
be due to its having been displayed by Duchamp, i.e., 
by someone who had already gained a certain status in, 
had been enfranchised by, the artworld, as a result of 
his earlier production of more conventional artworks. 
That having attained some sort of status in the 
artworld is necessary for legitimately presenting 
something as a candidate for appreciation seemed tg 
have been both implied and denied by Dickie's remarks. 
It had been implied by an analogy which Dickie offered 
between Duchamp's offering something as a candidate for 
appreciation and a head of an election board declaring 
someone a candidate for alderman (since only someone 
duly enfranchised by appropriate authority can 
meanfully declare someone a candidate for alderman). 
It had been denied by Dickie's remarks to the effect 
that, e.g., a plumbing salesman, rather than Duchamp, 
might (presumably while remaining a plumbing salesman, 
at least to the extent of not having "gained status" by 
producing preliminary works of art) have conferred the 
appropriate status upon the urinal. 
distinction, admittedly a fine one, between madness and 
art. 
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In reply, Dickie contended that these two analogies 
were nmpliative rather than incompatible. For him, the 
sense in which the plumbing salesman could have made 
art out of a urinal is the sense in which he could 
have, if it had occurred to him to do so: "The 
salesman could do what Duchamp did, that is, convert a 
urinal into a work of .art, but such a tiling probably 
would not occur to him". 
One's conservative inclination is to shrink from 
this claim, since it seems to imply that having the 
thought occur to someone to make something into a work 
of art is all that is required to have the appropriate 
status in the artworld. Surely, one is tempted to say, 
surely more is required--perhaps the cooperation of 
museum directors, of art patrons, of someone whose 
position in the artworld is a little more secure or 
elevated. 
But no; Dickie seems intent upon extending his 
liberality to the limit: 
The institutional theory of art may 
sound like saying, "A work of art is 
an object of which someone has said, 
1 I christen this object a work of 
art-,'" And it is rather like that . 
And, despite Dickie's immediate qualification of the 
above remark--" . . . although this does not mean that 
the conferring of the status of art is a simple 
matter" — the general drift of Iiis argument makes it 
appear a very simple matter indeed, requiring only the 
uttering of a short formula by someone (and here 
"someone" is clearly meant to be synonomous with 
"anyone") who understands what he is saying. This is, 
of course, not to deny that it is a complicated 
cultural matter to produce a linguistic community 
comprised of people, most of whom are capable of 
significantly saying, "I christen this object a work of 
art. " It is only to say that, given the existence of 
such a community, there is, seemingly, in Dickie's 
view, nothing easier than producing art. Any child 
(plumbing salesman, normal speaker) could do it. 
Perhaps so, but let us go on. With respect to the 
second question, Cohen wondered whether there might not 
be certain things which are not quiaified to receive 
the bestowed status of art, and he believed that 
Dickie's very definition suggested the class of such 
things. Since Dickie required that art objects have 
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been offered as candidates for appreciation, it follows 
straightaway that just as nothing can be a promise 
which cannot (for whatever conceptual reason) be 
accepted, nothing can be offered as a candidate for 
appreciation which cannot be appreciated (or at least 
of which it is thought that it cannot be appreciated). 
If, then, there is anything of which it is thought that 
it cannot be appreciated, that tiling cannot be a work 
of art. 
Are there such things? The answer will depend upon 
what is meant by "appreciation." Dickie allows the 
notion considerable rein, so that one can be said to 
appreciate something if "in experiencing the qualities 
of I the] thing one finds them worthy or valuable." 
Generous as this definition is, certain things, 
Cohen suspected, probably still escape it, and he cited 
thumbtacks, cheap envelopes, plastic forks, and, 
intriguingly, "Fountain," as examples. Iiis doubts 
about the first three sorts of things are obvious 
enough: they are, after all, so ordinary and dull. 
The case of "Fountain" is more complex. What is 
noteworthy about "Fountain," if anything is, is that it 
was selected, as were many works of Dada, by its 
advocate precisely because of its apparent lack of 
appreciable qualities. Cohen quotes Michael Fried 
expressing anxiety about whether Dada had wrenched art 
too far away from its traditional concern with 
appreciation, but he might more disturbingly have 
quoted the artist himself; speaking of his 
"Readymades," ordinary objects supposedly converted 
into art simply by indexing them as such, Duchamp said: 
A point I want very much to 
establish is that the choice of 
these Readymades was never dictated 
by aesthetic delectation. The 
choice was based on a reaction of 
visual indifference with a g total 
absence of good or bad taste. 
Dickie's reply to this sort of counterexample 
seemed completely to miss the point. Anything, he 
appears to have said, has some quality or qualities 
which can be appreciated. Even "Fountain" "has many 
qualities which can be nappreciated—its gleaming white 
surface, for example." 
Maybe so, though Duchamp might no doubt have 
remedied that particular oversight—by being less 
fastidious in his choice of urinals, perhaps. But this 
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is silly. Any self-respecting Dadaist would have taken 
Dickie's remark as a challenge, and gone hurrying off 
in search of something which no one could appreciate, 
in any sense of "appreciate" narrower than the one in 
which it means simply "perceive." 
The point is obvious. Robert Barry once had an 
exhibition in a gallery in which nothing was displayed, 
the door was locked, and the only evidence that an 
artist was even involved was a sign hung outside the 
door which read: "For the exhibition the gallery will 
be closed." What is being offered as a candidate for 
appreciation here? The sign? Should we carefully 
inspect it for qualities which we find worthy or 
valuable? Its texture, perhaps? The neat lettering? 
The point is exactly what Cohen said it was: what 
the Dadaists (and, more recently and forcefully, such 
groups as minimal artists, body artists, conceptual 
artists) were offering were not objects for 
appreciation, but rather, at least sometimes, remarks, 
theories, even jokes about art. Their point, and it is 
not very far at all from Dickie's, is that anything, 
even nothing, can be accorded the status of being art, 
and not by so avuncular a means as offering it as a 
candidate for anyone's appreciation either, but simply: 
Presto! Chango! The artist as magician. 
4. 
So here is the situation. Dickie wants us to 
accept: "Fountain." as, obviously, a piece of art, but 
for reasons which Duchamp himself would resist. It 
would seem that, in the fact of this difficulty, Dickie 
has only two alternatives. Either he might say that 
the notion of "appreciation" he is invoking is liberal 
enough to accommodate varieties of "finding worthy or 
valuable," other than "finding the sensible qualities 
in themselves worthy or valuable" e.g., finding the 
theory or remark or joke symbolically expressed 
worthwhile or valuable to reflect upon. Or, he might 
deny that "Fountain" is art. 
Let us assume that he would not do the latter. If 
he did the former, then his view would be the same as 
Danto's. For, if the only appreciable qualities of 
"Fountain" are, say, the attractiveness and importance 
of the theory about art which it symbolizes or 
adumbrates, and if it is nonetheless art, then, indeed, 
the distinction between art and philosophy has 
collapsed. 
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Concepts change, there is no denying that. And 
perhaps the concepts of art and philosophy might change 
(have they already?) in such ways as to collapse the 
distinction between them. That would have happened, I 
suppose, whenever it had come about that everything 
which was called "art" was produced only in order to 
make or illustrate a point about something and examined 
only in order to discover and assess that point. That 
could happen; it has obviously happened already with 
respect to quite a few things which currently are 
called "art." 
But are there reasons for retaining, or at least 
encouraging the retainment of, the distinction? I 
think so, and I will attempt to say what these reasons 
are in the remainder of this paper. 
5. 
Paul Ziff is clearly right in pointing out that it 
is an important matter whether something is considered 
to be a work of art or not, because of "tb.f 
characteristic social consequences and implications" 
of doing so. In Western society, Ziff notes, such 
consequences include that a work so considered is 
likely to find its way into a public museum, to have 
public funds spent on it, to be read about and studied 
by the public. 
Ziff is careful not to restrict the possibilities 
for such consequences or implications, noting that 
"they have- varied in time, and no doubt will continue 
to do so." His caution is justifiable, for the 
relativist might point to the fact that it was once a 
characteristic implication of something's being 
considered a work of art that it be buried away with 
its expired owner, talismanically to aid him or her 
with the complications of the netherworld. Or she 
might point to another time and place, where it was 
such a consequence that the artist have his fingers 
lopped off prior to execution, all of this before a 
stadium filled with political prisoners. Or, 
finally, she might point to some possible future time, 
when the consequences might be whatever you please, 
perhaps even that the thing in question be avoided or 
ignored as anathema or - danger to some perverse 
worldview or another. 
Still, despite this variety, both actually past and 
futurally possible, I think it is worthwhile to draw 
attention to one particular consequence which has been 
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characteristic of something's being considered to be 
art throughout the Western tradition, and throughout 
the non-Western traditions as well, so far as I know. 
That is that there lias always been a tendency to 
contemplate closely in the mode or modes appropriate to 
the medium or media anything which has been considered 
to be art. There has been a tendency to listen 
carefully to music, to scrutinize paintings intensely, 
to exercise imagination vigorously in reading works of 
fiction. And other artforms—oral poetry, opera, 
movies—have, of course, elicited more complex 
structural modes of close contemplation. 
Why is it important to draw attention to this 
hopefully non-controversial fact? Because it suggests 
strongly that, amidst whatever surroundings, art has 
served some abiding function, has met some deep-seated 
human need. 
What that need (or needs) might be is a matter for 
discussion, and it is a discussion which for over two 
thousand years preoccupied philosophers concerned with 
art, though it has not sparked much interest in the 
established Anglo-American tradition for some 
considerable time. I shall have some suggestions to 
make about it in section 10. 
But for the moment, although we leave it nameless, 
let us suppose that there is at least one such thing, 
that art has long persisted in response to some human 
demand, however clearly felt or explicitly articulated, 
that it exist. What would follow from that in terms of 
the question at hand, viz., whether and to what the 
appellation "art" should be restricted? 
What would follow depends upon determination of the 
following matters: 
1) whether that unnamed need is one 
which we ought to continue to meet; 
and 
2) whether restricting the use of "art" 
in some manner, with all the 
predictable consequences of so doing, 
would be a singularly good way of 
accomplishing that aim. 
Suppose that both of these questions were answered 
in the affirmative; then we would have good reason, 
other things being equal, to encourage such 
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restriction, and to resist certain efforts at expansion 
(although not all expansion in every direction). 
For example, we might have good reason—and I 
stress might, for there are a number of complications— 
to excise "Fountain," "Documenta 5," Robert Barry's 
empty gallery, and a goodly number of others from the 
realm of art. It is that possibility which 1 will now 
explore, and I will do so by the methodologically odd 
device of first giving and elaborating upon my 
suggestion for what the restriction should be, before 
returning, in section 10, to the very difficult matter 
of providing the justification for that restriction. 
The reasons for taking this roundabout route will be 
clear by the time we reach that section, and I will 
also return there to the two matters for consideration 
mentioned above. 
6. 
My suggestion is that it be required, as a 
necessary condition for something's being considered to 
be art, that it have been produced by an artist with 
the intention, in large part, of creating something of 
aesthetic value. 
This requirement may sound a little naive, but I 
think that, on inspection, it will prove not to be 
naive at all, but instead very sensible. Let me try to 
establish this by examining its three obviously 
contentious elements, viz., its reliance upon the 
thing's having been created by an artist, its reference 
to the artist's intentions, and its invocation of the 
notion of aesthetic value. 
7. 
What prompts me to require of art that it be 
produced by an artist is a certain degree of discomfort 
which I feel upon reading such things as the following: 
[In the artworld we] would expect to 
see . . . Beethoven symphonies, 
Irish folk songs, short but 
interesting compositions by a five 
year old named Mozart, we would 
expect Paradise Lost, love sonnets, 
lines of verse written by a ghetto 
child on an alley wall; we would 
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expect marbles depicting 
mythological figures, wires dangling 
from a ceiling, Brillo boxes, welded 
configurations of scrap iron, a 
papier-mache model made in Miss 
Kunst's tenth grade art class. i 2 n e 
could go on indefinitely . . . . 
Must one expect to see these things in the 
artworld? Why must one? If one must see them all as 
members, may one nonetheless distinguish between them 
in terms of their credentials? 
There are two ways in which one's membership in an 
institution may be, so to say, unelevated. On the one 
hand, one may be a full-fledged but uninfluential 
member: a novice in the priesthood, cub in the Boy 
Scouts, private in the army. On the other hand, one's 
membership may be less than full-fledged: one might be 
an honorary member, a provisional member, or an 
apprentice. 
If I must look upon a child's graffiti as art, or 
papier-mache models in a tenth grade art class, or, 
carrying this sort of reasoning to its hilt, the 
doodles my colleague incessently concocts at boring 
lectures, may not I at least see them as less than 
full-fledged art? Why exactly must I provide a theory 
which accords them unconditionaTT though unelevated, 
membership? 
Suppose the child scribbles, not a rhyme, but 
rather, "I drink, therefore I'm a man." If I am trying 
to say what philosophy is, must 1 be careful to couch 
what 1 say in such terms as to ensure that this 
protophi]osophical remark has full status in the 
philosophy-world? Must anything which bears any 
relation to obviously full-fledged members of a 
particular x-world themselves be full-fledged members? 
Suppose the child had written, "I am equal to you." 
Must we define mathematics in such a way as to ensure 
that this is a full-fledged member of the mathematics 
world? 
But what about these short pieces of the five-year-
old Mozart? Surely they are art, and if they are art, 
then the crude productions of all five-year-old 
children, whether on the piano or on ghetto walls, must 
also be art. 
Yes, these early Mozarts probably are art; but need 
it therefore be true that anything which bears some 
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resemblance to them, however remote, is art? When my 
five-year-old child dribbles her fists across the 
keyboard, are her productions necessarily also art? 
But then, by the same reasoning, the trills of 
songbirds are art. 
I suspect that the assumption upon which this sort 
of demand rests is one which has it that art must be 
thought of in the same way in which we think of, e.g., 
determinate symbols, things like words. Let me explain 
by offering a consideration which will also be relevant 
to the following section. 
Suppose I walk into a classroom and see a strange 
mark on the blackboard—suppose it is this mark: ' 
I am about to erase it when one of my students—a 
budding Arabic scholar—offers the information that it 
is the Arabic word for "plum." We conjecture for a few 
minutes about how it might have gotten there, whether 
it was written by someone who knew what it meant or 
whether, just by coincidence, someone happened to 
scribble something which was this word. We cannot 
decide, so I erase the board, and the class begins. 
What is to be noted about and this is always true 
of such symbols, is that they are symbolic, whatever 
the intentions of the person who produces them, or even 
whether they are produced by anyone at a l l — a cloud 
formation of the number seven is an instance of the 
number seven. 
Suppose it were necessary to think of art in this 
way.' It would follow that it is unnecessary to 
determine whether a thing was created by someone, and 
to ask after his intentions in doing so, to see whether 
it was art. And we would then have reason to speculate 
about what the relevant conventions are for something's 
being art—and perhaps we would decide, with Dickie, 
that they were certain conventions of the 
contemporaneous artworld. 
But it is not necessary—I also want to say, not 
even best—to think of art in this way. We may instead 
think of it in the way in which we think of purposeful 
symbolic constructions, e.g., messages. If I discover 
this mark on the board: ' 1 # and I learn that it is 
Arabic for "Help!," I still don't know whether I've 
discovered a message or not. To know that, I would 
have to know that someone put it there with a certain 
intention. 
Similarly, that my child's hammering bears a close 
resemblance to certain modern pieces of music is no 
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proof positive that it is art, any more than the 
resemblance of the wind through the willows to soft 
violins makes it art. At least one thing more which is 
needed, I suggest, is the participation of an artist. 
What makes someone an artist? Surely not merely 
that he produces something which bears a resemblance to 
archetypal cases of art. If that were true, then 
housepainters would be artists. But if that is false, 
then there is no reason to insist that the students in 
Miss Kunst's tenth grade class are artists, or that my 
frolicsome child is an artist, or the ghetto child. 
What makes someone an artist? Being an artist is 
not like being a Caucasian or a male. Artisthood is a 
role, like philosopherhood—but not like parenthood or 
priesthood. It is something which one can step into 
and out of in a flash: that is why philosophers can 
also act as artists, and artists as philosophers. 
To have taken on the role of an artist is not to 
have taken a profession, though of course there is a 
profession occupied by those who have made this role 
their main professional role in life. 
How could a philosopher (or a secretary, or a 
nurse) act as an artist? By having understood what it 
is to engage in a certain intentional activity, and by 
intentionally engaging in that activity. 
Why isn't the person who accidentally scrawls '\ 1 
on the blackboard sending a message? Because he didn't 
see that point in what he was doing as he watched the 
figure emerge in front of his thoughtless hand. Why 
isn't what my child bangs out on the piano art? 
Because she is only trying to make noise, to occupy 
time, to annoy her father. 
Why is what Mozart produced art? Because he 
(precociously) intended to create something of 
aesthetic value. 
Why is it that what Schwarzkogler did was 
(probably) not art? Because he was (probably) simply 
insane. Because we must strongly suspect (though here 
is a case in which we shall never know, and nor does it 
matter) that his intentions had become unraveled and 
alien, in the way of the mad. 
8 . 
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My formulation clearly contains a redundancy. In 
it, I require that the producer of the object be an 
artist—be acting as an artist—and acting as an 
artist, I have said, only means acting with a certain 
intention. I might, therefore, simply have said that 
art is whatever is created with, in large part, a 
certain intention. There is that redundancy, but, 
since redundancy is not logically pernicious, I choose 
to allow it because it enables me to focus upon this 
supposed problem of doodles, scrawls, and crude papier-
mache molds with no danger of that discussion's being 
interrupted by a completely different problem 
concerning intentions with which it is sometimes 
confusingly conflated. Let me now turn to this 
problem, and leave it to the reader's discretion 
whether he wishes to whittle the formulation down to 
its barest bones. 
There is a kind of objection which is very commonly 
made against views which rely, as this one does, upon 
intentions. The objection runs somewhat as follows: 
If this view were correct, then we could not know if 
something was an example of art unless we knew what the 
intentions' of the person who produced it were at the 
time. But that is absurd. For obviously we can know 
that e.g., Marlowe's Faustus is a work of art, even 
though there is no means of determining what Marlowe's 
intentions were when he produced it. And similarly for 
Grecian urns, African masks, neolithic cave paintings, 
and so on, where, first, we don't even know who the 
producers were, and second, we have good reason to 
think that, whoever they were, their intentions were, 
in the main, other than the ones required by this view 
for art. 
There are two sorts of mistakes involved in 
offering these two types of supposed counterexamples. 
To the second type, the correct reply to make is 
simply that what is at issue is whether Grecian urns, 
cave paintings, and so on, are examples of art. It 
will not do to say that obviously they are, since they 
are written about in art textbooks, exhibited in art 
museums, and such like. The person who supports the 
view under attack here is precisely the one who denies 
that these are decisive criteria for determining 
whether something is art. 
The first sort of counterexample is different, for 
no one would seriously deny that Faustus is a work of 
art,, and, moreover, it would seem safe to say that 
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Marlowe's intentions in producing it are lost in the 
past, never to be recovered. 
But is that true? Are Marlowe's intentions really 
lost in the past? What would lead anyone to say that, 
aside from the most arid kind of epistemological 
skepticism? We have as good a sign as could possibly 
be required of what some of Marlowe's intentions were 
in writing Faustus, a sign at least as good as any 
contemporaneous first-person report would have been. 
That sign is, of course, Faustus. 1 can say, with as 
much confidence as our existential isolation allows, 
that Marlowe intended to create something of beauty to 
delight and entertain an audience. Of course, it is 
conceivable that he had no such intention, that his 
sole intention was (say) to enable himself to pay off 
hTs debts. It is also conceivable that he wrote it in 
his sleep, or that it was not written by Marlowe at 
all, but instead came into existence by some remarkable 
machination only yesterday, all copies of it, along 
with all commentaries on it and all our reflective 
associations about it. Any of these is conceivable, 
but let us not philosophize in that vacuum. 
And now, returning to the other sort of 
counterexample, we can see that the view under 
consideration is really not so disruptive as it might 
have seemed. I, for one, am not the least 
uncomfortable in saying that Greek vase paintings show 
evidence of considerable aesthetic concern; in fact, I 
cannot quite imagine what sort of possibility someone 
who denied this would be relying upon: that the 
symmetry, evocative power, and narrative urgency of 
these beautiful things might be mere happenstance? And 
similarly for the heroic grace and regal coloration of 
African warmasks, the fine, dizzying balances of 
Persian carpets, the witty elegance of certain 
Chippendales. 
Cave paintings, I suppose, largely inhabit the 
border areas: the Altamira Standing Bison and the 
painted hunters from Cueva del Civil clearly reflect 
aesthetic concern; the engravings from Bohuslan 
probably do not. These latter are difficult cases, but 
not in the sense of cases which pose difficulties for 
the theory. On the contrary, it seems to me a mark in 
favor of the theory that it allows for exploration and 
hypothesis about a certain range of cases. To 
reiterate one of Cohen's concerns, it is a troubling 
aspect of alternative theories that they make the 
question of what is art naively easy. 
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9. 
We come now to the question of aesthetic value and, 
in so doing, we pick up again on the issues raised in 
section 5. 
The logical problem posed by the requirement I have 
suggested is clearly one of avoiding circularity, of 
avoiding defining "aesthetic value" in some way such 
as, "the value attaching to works of art." Such a 
claim would be bootless, amounting, in effect, to 
saying that art must be created by someone with the 
intention, in large part, of creating art. 
This logical problem is fairly immomentous, for the 
history of aesthetics offers us plentiful candidates 
for such uncompromised value: Kant's Gemeingueldiqkeit 
between the faculties of understanding and imagination 
is one example; Dewey's communication through objective 
form of emotional meaning is another; Tolstoy's 
communication of emotion a third. The real problem, if 
one is seeking to understand the phenomenon of art by 
reading the great aestheticians, is to .assess these 
views according to other criteria: coherence, 
consistency, intelligibility, phenomenological 
adequacy, etc. 
I will not do that here. Instead, I will draw 
attention to a value so steadily associated with what 
have always been conceded to be artworks, while being 
so unportentous, that it may serve as a hallmark of 
art's presence without presupposing, say, elaborate 
metaphysical commitments (Kant), or a complicated 
theory of meaning (Dewey), or a dubious epistemology 
(Tolstoy). 
I said earlier that one characteristic consequence 
of something's being considered to be art that has 
persevered through the colorful history of such 
consequences is that an object so considered is likely 
to be the subject of close contemplation on the part of 
some public in the mode appropriate to the medium of 
the object. I now propose that the reason for the 
persistance of this characteristic consequence is that 
art, throughout the ages, has served always the 
function of educating its audience to see, to hear, to 
imagine, and to feel, and that these faculties yearn 
for development as avidly as the stomach doeö for food. 
There is no single term which is perfectly suited 
to name the genus for the various species of 
development I have in mind. "To feel" leans away from 
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sight and sound; "to perceive" and "to experience" ore 
both too occurrent and object-bound. "To sense" is 
scarcely better, but it does have the considerable 
advantage of a cognate in the nominative case, as when 
we speak of someone's sense of balance, or sense of 
color and line, which well accords with certain points 
1 want to make about the value in question. 
Accordingly, I will speak generally of art's capacity 
to teach its audience to sense, leaving it to the 
ensuing remarks to clarify TTle usage. 
Let me give an example of the sort of educative 
process I have in mind. We find a clue to the realm of 
clearest examples in the well-worn phrase, "a sense of 
taste," which serves to applaud sophistication in all 
other realms. Let us talk of cookery. 
What is it for a palate to develop? It is two 
things, or rather, two aspects of the same thing. On 
the one hand, it is to acquire intimacy with the 
indefinite complexity of the world of food. As faces 
and personalities gradually take shape out of an 
anonymous background for a stranger in a community, so 
the many inhabitants of the food world acquire 
recognizable character for the explorer in its regions. 
What was once one mustard suddenly becomes two, and 
then three, and one is astounded at having failed 
hitherto to distinguish them. We may speak of this as 
the education of the palate. 
On the other hand, to develop a palate is to 
develop a discrimination; it is to be able to judge new 
taste sensations, both as to their category and their 
quality. Hume long ago made the point elegantly enough 
to free the rest of us for other reflections. In 
matters of sensuous discernment, the judgments to be 
trusted are those issuing from authority gained through 
long and serious study. Nowhere is this clearer than 
in eating. To the standard objection that even experts 
sometimes disagree, the proper reply is to point to the 
remarkable concurrence of opinion, against which the 
occasional spat (oftentimes more politically than 
aesthetically motivated) shrinks almost to nil in 
significance. To the other usual objection, both more 
sophisticated and more disingenuous, that the claim is 
circular because it defines what is good as what is 
pronounced to be so by those qualified to judge, and 
then names the relevant qualification as the ability to 
recognize what is good, there is also an easy reply. 
For that is not what the qualification amounts to; 
rather, one Ts qualified to pronounce on such matters 
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once one has gone through a period of long and close 
study of the subject matter. It just happens to be the 
case, as a contingency, that there is such remarkable 
concurrence among the qualified groups as to what is to 
be preferred. It is not a part of the definition of 
that group that there be that concurrence, but that 
there is supports rather than undermines the central 
claim. 
So, we will take it as established that 
discrimination in taste grows with practice. 
It happens that there is a class of people, 
subsidized in various ways, whose professional 
dedication to culinary concerns has paved the way for 
more general palate development. I name only a few 
from that honor roll: Carerne, Escoffier, Soule. 
Through their schools, their showplaces, and their 
publications, they all contributed to the refinement, 
both in education and discrimination, of the palates of 
those fortunate enough to have had access to them. 
Is that spreading effect a good thing or not? We 
will come back to that question, but first, let us look 
at an activity more universally considered to be at the 
center of art. 
For purposes of space, I will limit my remarks to 
painting. I believe that if the sort of claim I wish 
to make is plausible with respect to painting, it will 
also, mutatis mutandis, be plausible with respect to 
literature, music, dance, architecture, sculpture, and 
the combinations of these in more complex genres. 
Painting is a mode of activity which lends itself, 
in the first place, to visual address; the medium for 
whatever further accomplishments paintings may achieve 
consists entirely of an assortment of pigments, whose 
smells rapidly disappear after they have dried, leaving 
only color and line and texture for appreciation. 
What have painters accomplished with their 
pigments? An enormous variety of things, of course. 
They have found in paint the possibility for 
representation, illusion, conveyance of impression, 
emotional expression, and so on. 
But there is one accomplishment, I suggest, which 
has run through these others like a thread through 
variegated beads. What I have in mind is this: 
throughout its history, painting has refined the sight 
of its audience. 
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Taking our direction from the remarks about 
cookery, we may divide this refinement into elements of 
education and discrimination. Thus, one function which 
painting has served is to show its audience what the 
artist saw, to present to the audience the fine detail, 
articulation, and intensity of the visual or 
imaginative scene available without mediation to the 
artist. Just as cookery has educated people to the 
subtlety of the gustatory world available to the 
palate, so painting has educated people to the 
subtleties available to the eye. No one (who has 
pursued a serious course of study of the development 
and greatest examples of landscape painting] can fail 
to appreciate the available qualities of a landscape 
with greater refinement than before. The variations on 
a basic common theme, wooded hillside, say, hovering 
over water; the community of theme itself; the 
astonishing ways in which nature achieves its visual 
effects: these and many, many other qualities become 
vastly easier of access to the eye trained in their 
appreciation. Similarly, the human face and form 
become donors of much richer and more multifarious 
detail to the eye educated in their perusal by the 
masters of figure study and portraiture. And who had 
ever contemplated old shoes with much attention and 
interest, before Van Gogh turned our undivided visual 
attention to a particularly dilapidated pair? And who, 
having given "Shoes of a Peasant" close study, can fail 
to look down and see his or her own in a new light? 
Nor is this any the less true of art Which 
repudiates illusion, as Van Gogh's painting already 
begins to show. Even at its most abstract extremes, 
painting serves that function. Rothko's monochromes 
educated our eyes to the expressive properties of, 
e.g., various hues of gray. Why are overcast days 
gloomy? In part because gray, in certain tonalities 
and certain contexts, just is expressively gloomy. I 
look out of the window of my office. Directly below, 
the parking lot has been repaved over the summer, and 
it is a very dark gray. Beyond it, the lighter gray of 
the older asphalt road cuts across. The road looks 
distant, impersonal, a little threatening. It would 
not have looked so to me before I began looking closely 
at Rothko's work, any more than one kind of mustard 
would have tasted slightly more piquant to me than 
another before I was educated to their difference. 
Similarly, the dancing yellow and red and blue squares 
in Mondrian's "Broadway Boogie Woogie" teach one to see 
the expressive possibilities of yellow and red and 
blue, perhaps for the first time, certainly more keenly 
than one did before. And in the same vein, Cubism gave 
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us lessons in the shifting geometrical understructure 
of the world, Futurism in the complex dynamics of that 
shifting, and so on. 
And just as the palate's refinement leads through 
education to discrimination, so the educated eye 
becomes an eye capable of, usually eager for, further 
unassisted exploration. Not all natural motifs have 
had the attention of painters, probably not even a 
large fraction, but the eye schooled in those which 
have been treated finds itself in time a fit critic of 
those which have not. Once attuned to the expressive 
properties of flat expanses of certain colors, once 
trained in their inspection, other colors begin to 
beckon. The Italian Futurist, Giorgio de Chirico, 
made the same point with great force speaking of one of 
his own paintings: 
Sometimes the horizon is defined by 
a wall behind which rises the noise 
of a disappearing train. The whole 
nostalgia of the infinite experience 
the most unforgettable movements 
when certain aspects of the world, 
whose existence we completely 
ignore, suddenly confront us with 
the revelation of mysteries lying 
all the time within our reach and 
which we cannot see because we are 
too short-sighted, and cannot feel 
because our senses are inadequately 
developed. Their dead voices speak 
to us from near-by, but they sound 
like voices from another planet. J 
Suppose this is true; is it important? Again, 1 
delay addressing this question, this time in order to 
make two points. 
First, it is the farthest thing from my mind that 
art either has in the past or should continue to have 
this educative function as its only task and promise. 
What painters, to stay with them, can accomplish 
through their medium is limited only by their 
individual and communal genius, by their history, and 
by the climate of their times, not by anything I have 
suggested. That "Guernica" has been of greater moral 
moment than most ethical treatises written in this 
century is sufficient testimony to the almost 
miraculous possibilities of paint. 
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Second, I have limited my proposal to providing 
only a necessary condition for something's being 
considered to be art for the following reasons: a) 
because I think that merely requiring it of art, 
without running the theoretical risks of over-extension 
which sufficiency conditions always bring in their 
wake, would be of adequate consequence to achieve the 
desirable .end which I shall discuss in the next 
section; and b) to qualify the proposal in such a way 
as to make it adequate to serve as a statement of both 
necessary and sufficient conditions would require more 
space than presently available. Let me, however, 
before proceeding to the final stage of the argument, 
just gesture in the direction in which such a 
development, in my view, should proceed. 
There are three things, I would argue, which are 
especially characteristic of the artist's methods of 
teaching to sense. First, they are highly skilled; 
second, they are elaborate; and third, they proceed 
through a process which I call ostension, a kind of 
pointing. 
Thus, the practice of art has historically followed 
upon a period of training designed to develop and hone 
the relevant skills of the individuals concerned. 
Except for the freakish few, almost all of them 
musicians, whom nature gifts prodigiously and without 
prior payment, the history of art is a history of ice 
tips above mountains of labor and routine. 
"Elaborate" I use as a term covering features both 
internal and external to the artwork. A piece may be 
elaborate by being internally complex, or by being 
situated in and referred to the relevant context. So, 
for instance, Rothko's monochromes satisfied the 
elaborateness condition by virtue of their placement 
over against the preceding history of abstract 
expressionism. In a literal sense, the works of the 
other participants of that history surround Rothko's 
works just as responsively and responsibly as the dark 
brooding spaces of Rembrandt surround the nervous 
people in his portraits. 
When I say that art works through ostension, or 
that it Ostends, I am referring to the way in which a 
painting, say, proceeds by gathering the attention to 
itself and directing it from point to point, from 
region to region, or even (as in Rothko's case) beyond 
itself to other paintings. Painting does not tell you 
how the world looks; it shows you. And so also for 
literature, although not so obviously. I have, to 
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repeat, for reasons of space not brought the analysis 
of this paper to other genres, but here it would be 
well to note how literature educates the imagination 
and, consequently, the emotions. It is by creating a 
world, enticing the reader into it, situating the 
reader in a precise place in that world, and letting 
his or her natural powers of sympathy operate in that 
exact context. What are the varieties of pity and 
shame that one person can feel for another? Read the 
Dubliners and Joyce will educate you in dozens of them, 
not by telling you what they are—who ever learned to 
feel in a new way by hearing about it? but by 
involving you in the exactly appropriate setting and 
letting you feel it for yourself. 
These last remarks are both contentious and murky, 
I know. But I do think that, if the final stage of the 
argument coming up has any weight, then a very strong 
case could be made for stipulating, as a necessary and 
sufficient condition for something's being considered 
to be art, that it have been created by an artist with 
the intention, in large part, of creating something 
capable of educating its audience to sense through 
skillful, elaborate ostension. If the reader is at all 
persuaded by the concluding claim that there is good 
reason for accepting my necessary condition, then he or 
she should begin to see that there would be an a 
fortiori better reason for accepting the necessary and 
sufficient conditions. But I leave the working out of 
that claim to another time. 
10. 
We are now at the final stage, and we ask for the 
last time: Suppose this is true, is it important? 
Specifically, is it important that art be encouraged to 
continue serving this function, even at the expense of 
deflecting it to some degree from other functions, the 
philosophical, for instance, which it might wish to 
pursue? 
I think it is very important that art maintain this 
hold on its past, or, if you prefer, that its past 
maintain this hold on art. There are a number of 
reasons why it is important, the simplest being that it 
is just a good thing that highly trained teachers are 
available in these matters: the development and 
exercise of the senses is one of the fundamentally good 
things (one is tempted to say, with Moore, 
intrinsically good things) which human beings, 
constantly busy and beleagured, have chanced upon 
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during their turbulent history by some amazing good 
fortune. 
That alone would be sufficient, 1 am convinced, to 
justify encouraging any reasonable steps which would 
make more likely the continued existence of a class of 
people who are especially skilled in the promulgation of 
this good, and at leisure to do so. But I think that 
the danger of allowing or encouraging artists to drift 
farther and farther from their sensible media is even 
greater than this remark would indicate. For it is not 
only a considerable good which would be diminished with 
such drifting, but also the resistence to a 
considerable evil—and that is what is so deeply 
worrisome. 
One need not be of any particular political 
affliliation to realize that one of the, if not the, 
major dramas being enacted in modern industrialized 
societies is that concerning technology. It is a drama 
whose antagonists are technology under control and 
technology out of control, technology developing under 
reasoned moral guidance or developing according to its 
own internal impetus. 
I do not feel I need to argue, nor could 1 possibly 
do so in this space, that techno]ogy out of control 
would be a very, very bad thing. Heidegger, for one, 
has spoken to the issue with great sophistication in 
The Question Concerning Technology, and I refer the 
reader to that essay. So I shall simply assume that 
it would be a bad thing, and make one last claim based 
upon that assumption, a claim which will bring this 
paper to its close. 
My claim is that the developed ability to sense is 
one of the major obstacles in the way of technology 
growing out of control. If that is so, then an 
extemely strong prima facie case will have been 
established for taking reasonable steps to safegaurd 
and further develop that ability. 
Is it so? I cannot prove that it is so; it is not 
the sort of claim that admits of proof. But I hope I 
can recommend it to your serious reflection by the 
following remarks. 
No one, I suggest, Iwho had studied closely 
Rembrandt's human beings, or who had learned to feel 
with Joyce's haunted human souls| could continue to 
speak blithely, and without ever having reflected on 
what he or she was saying, about human resources. No 
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one [who had learned under Constable's guidance how to 
look at landscapes] could see a wooded hillside 
hovering over a lake merely a s — t o use Heidegger's 
term—standing reserve (a sort of energy reservoir). 
And no one could step out of the house in the morning 
and encounter the world with utter alienation and 
hopelessness after being taught by Rothko, Pollock, 
Mondrian, Klee, and Picasso that the world is 
constantly addressing itself, with undemanding 
beneficence and goodwill, to him or to her. 
The dehumanization of human beings, and the loss of 
wonder at the world—these are the handmaidens of 
technological progress, threatening always to clothe 
her completely according to their taste. Art, I 
suggest, perhaps preeminently, stands in their way. 
It should be a necessary condition for something's 
being considered to be art that it have been created by 
an artist with the intention, in large part, of 
creating something with the capacity for teaching its 
audience to sense. Should that proposal be generally 
accepted, we should have taken a significant step, 
given the characteristic social consequences of 
something's being considered to be a work of art, 
towards ensuring the existence of classes of people 
especially gifted and trained in the desired skills. 
The existence of such classes is in turn justified by 
the intrinsic good of its productivity, and by the evil 
threatened by its disappearance. That is the argument. 
But the point is, the way to the spirit is through, 7the 
senses, and it is human spirit which is in danger. 
Kenyon College 
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